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Default Production of Electronically Stored
Information Under the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: The Requirements of Rule 34(b)
VLAD J. KROLL*
INTRODUCTION
In 1996, only 5% of discoverable documents derived from electronic
format.' Today, over 9o% of all corporate information, much of which is
discoverable, is in electronic format, and 70% of that information has
never been printed to paper.' In some cases, the electronic information is
as large as a terabyte; printed to paper, this information would fill the
Sears Tower four times Nevertheless, the previous version of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ("the Rules") provided "scant guidance
as to when and in what form production of such material is appropriate."'
Consequently, in 2oo6, the Rules were amended specifically to
"address... discovery of electronically stored information."5 One issue
addressed, and partially resolved, by the amendments is that electronic
documents and data can be stored and produced in several different
forms.6
* J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2008; B.A., University
of California, Berkeley, 2005. I would like to thank Professor Richard L. Marcus for introducing me to
electronic discovery and for assisting me throughout the writing of this Note.
1. Daryl Teshima, Seven Deadly Sins of Electronic Discovery, L. OFF. COMPUTING, June-July
2003, available at http://www.strategicdiscovery.com/deadlysinsoi.htm.
2. C.C. Holland, E-Mail Analytics Eases Burden of Discovery, LAW.COM, Oct. 3, 2006, http://
www.law.com/jsp/legaltechnology/PubArticleFriendlyLT.jsp?id=I159792526769; see also Richard
Herrmann et al., Managing Discovery in the Digital Age: A Guide to Electronic Discovery in the
District of Delaware, 8 DEL. L. REV. 75, 75 (2005) ("[Clurrent statistics indicated that 93% of all
documents in the United States are created electronically."); Teshima, supra note 1 ("[O]ver 90
percent of all corporate communications is now electronic, and less than 30 percent is ever printed
(and thus collectible in paper form).").
3. Jason Krause, The Top Ten in Tech: It's Not Just What Stuff You Use, But What You Do with
It, 90 A.B.A. J. 34,38 (2004).
4. Ryan Horning et al., The Law & Technology: Electronic Discovery: The New Rules, 20 CHI.
BAR Ass'N REC. 51, 51 (2006).
5. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACrCE AND PROCEDURE, AGENDA E-18, REPORT
OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE TO THE CHIEF JUSTICE
OF THE UNITED STATES AND MEMBERS OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, at Rules-
Page 26 (2005) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT], available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
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Because electronic information can be provided in many different
formats, the rule that deals with the procedure for document production,
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 34(b) (hereinafter "Rule 34(b)"), was
amended to explain how parties should ask for different forms of
production.7 In addition to describing how such requests should be made,
Rule 34(b) contains several provisions dealing with what parties must do
if there has been no request for a specific form.' Rule 34(b)(ii) lists two
alternatives for the default form of production: the party can provide the
documents in the form which the information is "ordinarily maintained"
or in a form that is "reasonably usable."9
Despite efforts to make electronic discovery easier, the Rules do not
explain what is specifically required by the default form of production.' °
The default form is necessary when a party's request "does not specify
the form or forms for producing electronically stored information.""
Since Rule 34(b) does not define "ordinarily maintained" or "reasonably
usable," it is niot clear what a producing party can leave out of the
documents they produce. Additionally, because the producing party must
produce the information as it is "kept in the usual course of business,"' 2 it
is not clear how this requirement works in combination with the
requirement that the producing form be one that is "ordinarily
maintained" or "reasonably usable." Finally, Rule 34 does not specify
which default form should prevail if there is a conflict. For example, if
the information is provided in a form that is "ordinarily maintained" but
that is not "reasonably usable," it is not clear whether the Rule would be
satisfied. The issue is further complicated by the fact that the amended
Rule 34(b) permits a party to produce the requested information in only
one form.
This Note attempts to address all of these issues by focusing on how
courts and parties have dealt with these default forms. Specifically, this
Note looks at the option of providing information in an "ordinarily
maintained" form, compared with providing it in a "reasonably usable"
form. The ultimate question is: What is required of the parties under
Rule 34(b)(ii)?
rules/Reports/STo9-2oo5.pdf.
6. Id. at Rules-Page 26-27.
7. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (b).
9. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(ii).
to. See Williams v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 649 (D. Kan. 2005) ("Although the
proposed amendments to Rule 34 use the phrase 'in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained,' they provide no further guidance as to whether a party's production of electronically
stored information 'in the form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained' would encompass the
electronic document's metadata.").
i i. FED. R. Clv. P. 34 (b)(ii).
12. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (b)(i).
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This issue is especially important because electronic discovery has
become a very important part of litigation. Even though the Rules
anticipate and encourage parties to make specific requests for the format
for production they desire, it may be unreasonable to expect "one party
to know the format of the other party's electronic information well
enough to request a particular format at such an early stage."' 3
Consequently, the default format will likely be a topic of concern, and
both parties and courts should be aware of these difficulties, as well as
the possible solutions.
Individual plaintiffs may also be affected by these amendments,
because electronic discovery is not limited to disputes between large
corporations over complex transactions. 4 This is evidenced by plaintiffs'
counsel's advocacy at the public hearings on the proposed amendments,
where they argued that requiring a specific form may impose undue
burden on plaintiffs who are not technologically savvy enough to know
how to frame their request.'5 Because the amendments have been in
operation for a short time, few courts have interpreted the new
provisions.
This Note will begin by laying out a background of electronic
discovery and the amendments to the Rules. After presenting the
background, the Note will analyze the problem of default production by
interpreting what the Rule means. First, the Note will look at Rule
34(b)'s language to determine its plain meaning. Then it will examine
Rule 34(b) under the Rules' principle of interpretation set forth in Rule
i, which requires a construction that secures "the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action."'6 Finally, the Note will
examine the drafting history of the amendments to determine the
drafters' intent.
The Note will next demonstrate that one cannot determine what
Rule 34(b) requires through a plain meaning analysis, because of Rule
34(b)'s ambiguity. After looking to the policy of Rule i and the drafting
history of Rule 34, the Note will show that the phrases "ordinarily
maintained" and "reasonably usable" both require the production of
information in an objectively reasonably accessible format. Despite the
rare occasion where the responding party is required only to produce the
information in an "ordinarily maintained" form (for example, if it does
not have the information in a "reasonably usable" form), if the producing
13. Alan F. Blakley, Unanswered Questions in the December 2o06 Federal Rules Changes, 53 FED.
LAW. 39,44 (2006).
14. See, e.g., Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, 217 F.R.D. 309, 311-12 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (discussing
electronic discovery in a suit by an individual worker against her employer for gender discrimination
and illegal retaliation).
15. Alan F. Blakley, Document Production in a Strange Native Land, 53 FED. LAW. 16, 17 (2006).
i6. FED. R. Civ. P. i.
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party assists the receiving party to access the information effectively, it
becomes the equivalent of producing the information in a "reasonably
usable" form. Contrary to the appearance of Rule 34, a party must
always produce data in a "reasonably usable" form. In effect, a
"reasonably usable" form is not an alternative-it is a requirement.
Even though Rule 34(b)(ii) seems to say that a party does not have
to produce documents in a form that is "reasonably usable" if it produces
them in a form that is "ordinarily maintained," the production of
information in a form that is only "ordinarily maintained," but not
"reasonably usable," would be contrary to the policy of Rule I and the
intent behind the Rules as a whole. This Note encourages courts and
drafters of future rules of civil procedure to explicitly recognize the
problems with this construction and resolve any ambiguity created by
Rule 34(b).
I. BACKGROUND
A. A BRIEF INTRODUCTION TO ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
Traditional paper discovery "refers to the discovery of writings on
paper that can be read without the aid of some devices." 7 Electronic
discovery, on the other hand, refers to the discovery of "documents and
data [that] exist in a medium that can only be read through the use of
computers."'8 Data on media such as "cache memory, magnetic disks
(such as computer hard drives or floppy disks), optical disks (such as
DVDs or CDs), and magnetic tapes" are all electronic because they can
only be read through the use of special devices.'9 Because this data
includes "business applications, such as word processing, databases, and
spreadsheets [and] Internet applications, such as e-mail and the World
Wide Web,"2 it has become a substantial, if not a central, part of
discovery.'
Electronic discovery is different from paper discovery in several
ways, which all have important consequences for litigation. For example,
electronic data is more voluminous, more persistent, more dynamic, and
easier to search than paper documents.22 One of the most significant
17. The (2oo4) Sedona Principles: Best Practices, Recommendations & Principles for Addressing
Electronic Document Production, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 151, 151 (2004) [hereinafter Sedona Principles];
see also Homing et al., supra note 4. at 52. Paper discovery can also refer to "images on paper," as well
as writings. Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2oo6 Amendments to
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 4 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 171 , 173 (20O6).
i8. Sedona Principles, supra note 17.
19. Id.
2o. Bank of Amer. Corp. v. SR Int'l Bus. Ins. Co., No. o5 -CV5-5564, 2oo6 WL 3093174, at *6
(N.C. Super. Ct. Nov. 1, 2oo6).
21. Richard Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond Toward Brave New World or 1984?. 25 REv. LITIG.
633, 650 (2oo6).
22. See Homing et al., supra note 4, at 52.
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differences is the choice of forms of production that electronic discovery
provides.23
Before electronic discovery, documents were only produced in paper
form.2" Even though some documents, like microfilm, were stored in a
non-paper format, these forms "would be printed out on paper for the
purposes of discovery or document production."25 In contrast, electronic
discovery can be stored and produced in several different forms.26 For
example, a particular document can be produced "as a paper printout, as
a word processing file, exported to various other computer-readable file
formats, or imaged in TIFF [Tagged Image File Format] or PDF
[Portable Document Format] formats."2
Initially, the form-of-production discovery disputes focused on paper
,8versus electronic. Today, because of the variety of electronic forms,
litigation disputes have shifted to focusing on the particular form of
electronic production.29 Choosing electronic formats has become a
strategic decision, because each format conveys different information
and allows different levels of analysis, as well as logistical advantages and
disadvantages." For example, documents produced in TIFF or PDF were
converted from native files into photocopy-like static images where on
screen they appear as paper printouts.3" These formats have the
advantage of being portable and static-"they can be Bates stamped,
categorized and gathered into virtual file folders, and even readily
printed out for those who insist on handling paper."3
In contrast to the static formats, electronic files in their native
format, such as a word processing document, database, or spreadsheet,
are "dynamic,... behav[ing] the way they do in the active business
environment."33 Information in native file formats contains "embedded
data," consisting of editorial comments and changes, as well as functions
like mathematical formulas.34 The "embedded data," while not visible on
the computer screen, keeps track of prior versions of the visible data.3"
23. See FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b); Withers, supra note 17, at 186-88.
24. Withers, supra note 17, at 186.
25. Id.
26. Carl G. Roberts, The 20o6 Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
METRO. CoRP. COUNS., Sept. 2006, at 45, available at http://www.metrocorpcounsel.com/pd/
2oo6/September/45.pdf.
27. Id.











Files in their native format also contain non-apparent embedded records
of the document's creation and management, called "metadata." 6
"Metadata," or data about data, "describes the various instructional
software directives ... that permit a computer program to access and
manipulate data."37 It can be very useful to litigants because it "can
provide an electronic paper trail of who touched the document and what
they did.",8 In fact, by showing when a document was created or who
worked on the document, it has frequently been used by litigants as
"'smoking gun' evidence. ' '39
B. ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
In the 193os, inventions that would lead to electronic discovery had
not yet been invented-there was no Internet, no word-processing, no
electric typewriters, and no photocopier.4" For this reason, discovery of
electronic materials was not contemplated when the Rules were first
created in I938.' Over the next three decades, technological
developments created a large impact on discovery, and in 1970, the Rules
were amended "to accord with changing technology" and to account for
discovery of "electronic data compilations from which information can
be obtained only with the use of detection devices."42 These data
compilations were included in the Rules as an example of "documents,"
on the assumption that electronic information fell within the broad
definition of "documents" in the Rules.43
The Advisory Committee Notes accompanying the 1970 version of
Rule 34 stated that because the producing party may have to translate
the documents into usable form, "in many instances, this means that
respondent will have to supply a print-out of computer data."' Thus, the
1970 version of Rule 34 did not speak to the possibility of multiple forms,
because the assumption was that electronic data would be produced as
computer printouts. This assumption was based on the notion that "in
those days, computers were owned and operated only by the largest and
most sophisticated banks, insurance companies, academic institutions,
36. Withers, supra note 17, at 188.
37. 8A WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 35.
38. Peter Mierzwa, Metadata: Now You Don't See It-Now You Do, 20 CHI. BAR ASS'N REC. 52,
52 (2006).
39. See id.
40. Richard Marcus, Complex Litigation at the Millennium: Confronting the Future: Coping with
Discovery of Electronic Material, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 259 (2001).
41. See Nat'l Union Elec. Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1257, 1262 (E.D. Pa.
198o) ("It may well be that Judge Charles E. Clark and the framers of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure could not foresee the computer age.").
42. FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes; see also Marcus, supra note 40, at 258.
43. Marcus, supra note 2i, at 650.
44. FED. R. Civ. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
[Vol. 59:221
ELECTRONIC PRODUCTION
and government agencies."45 Because most litigants did not possess and
operate computers, "[piroduction of electronically stored information in
electronic form would have been useless." 6 Consequently, even though
the old Rule 34 did not discuss choices of form of production, or default
forms of production, the omission was not problematic during that time
period.
Due to the advancement of technology, the old Rule 34 became
insufficient for addressing important litigation problems. By the mid
i98os, most litigation involved "discovery of some type of computer-
stored information, '  and the emerging reality was that some
electronically stored information did not fit into any of the existing
definitions of "document. '44 An example of such problems was the
debate over whether a web page constitutes a document or documents.40
Another issue was whether dynamic databases that are "capable of
providing a variety of information in response to a query [and are]
constantly changing as data are added or modified" could be called
documents."
Further technological advances led to the mass production of
computers, resulting in smaller and cheaper models. As computers
became ubiquitous, "running standardized operating systems and off-the-
shelf application software, the exchange of electronically stored
information in a variety of forms became possible."'" Even though large
scale document production in paper form was still common in smaller
cases, it was considered expensive and burdensome for most other
cases. 2 The 197o Rule 34, however, did not address the possibility of
multiple forms of production, and was thus insufficient to address these
changes in technology.
In the late 199os, the Rules were again amended, but the topic of
electronic discovery was not directly addressed. 3 However, the issue of
electronic discovery was brought up during the public comment period,
and the Rules' Advisory Committee decided to make electronic
discovery the focus of the next set of amendments.54 Thus, the Advisory
Committee embarked on an "extraordinarily broad, open, and inclusive
rulemaking process," lasting five years, to answer three fundamental
issues: (i) the differences between conventional and electronic discovery;
45. Withers, supra note 17, at i86.
46. Id.
47. Bills v. Kennecott Corp., io8 F.R.D. 459,462 (D. Utah t985).
48. Marcus, supra note 21, at 650.
49. See id.
50. Id.
51. Withers, supra note 17, at I86.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 191-92.
54. Id. at 192.
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(2) whether these differences create problems that can, or need to be
addressed through changes in the Rules; and (3) whether there are
problems that the Rules could or should address, and what rules could be
crafted to serve that purpose.5
The resulting amendments, which went into effect in December
2oo6, significantly changed most discovery rules. Electronically stored
information was no longer considered a subset of "documents," as was
the case under the 1970 Amendments. 56 Instead, under the revised Rules,
electronic data was considered to be a separate category, co-equal to
"documents," if not central to all discovery.17 The new amendments also
included important provisions regarding early conferences, 8 asserting
claims of privileges,59 spoliation and loss of electronically stored
information,6 and sanctions.6' The amended Rules also addressed the
possibility of multiple forms of production of electronically stored
information in Rule 34(b).62
As amended, Rule 34(b), which sets forth the procedure for
document requests and production, clarifies much of the procedure for
electronic discovery, but remains ambiguous in several ways that could
still impact litigation. Specifically, the requirements for the default
production of electronically stored information are not clear in the
Rules. In order to examine this ambiguity in greater detail, it is necessary
to turn to Rule 34(b) itself.
C. THE CHANGES TO RULE 34(b)
As amended, Rule 34 deals with "Production of Documents,
Electronically Stored Information, and Things and Entry Upon Land for
Inspection and Other Purposes. '' 6, Subsection (a) begins by describing
the scope, stating that a party may request "to inspect, copy, test, or
sample any designated documents or electronically stored information-
including writings, drawings, graphs, charts, photographs, sound
recordings, images, and other data or data compilations stored in any
medium from which information can be obtained-translated, if
necessary, by the respondent into reasonably usable form."
' 64
55. Id. at 172, 192.
56. Marcus, supra note 21, at 65o.
57- Id.
58. FED. R. CIv. P. I6.
59. FED. R. Cirv. P. 26.
6o. FED. R. Ov. P. 3 7 .
61. Id.
62. FED. R. Ov. P. 34(b).
63. FED. R. Civ. P. 34.
64. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(a).
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Subsection (b) then sets out the procedure for requesting the
information. The text of Rule 34(b) as amended by the 2006 amendments
states:
(b) PROCEDURE. The request shall set forth, either by individual item or
by category, the items to be inspected, and describe each with
reasonable particularity. The request shall specify a reasonable time,
place, and manner of making the inspection and performing the related
acts. The request may specify the form or forms in which electronically
stored information is to be produced. Without leave of court or written
stipulation, a request may not be served before the time specified in
Rule 26(d).
The party upon whom the request is served shall serve a written
response within 30 days after the service of the request. A shorter or
longer time may be directed by the court or, in the absence of such an
order, agreed to in writing by the parties, subject to Rule 29. The
response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that
inspection and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless
the request is objected to, including an objection to the requested form
or forms for producing electronically stored information, in whih .vt
stating the reasons for the objection shall be stated. If objection is
made to part of an item or category, the part shall be specified and
inspection permitted of the remaining parts. If objection is made to the
requested form or forms for producing electronically stored
information-or if no form was specified in the request-the responding
party must state the form or forms it intends to use. The party
submitting the request may move for an order under Rule 37(a) with
respect to any objection to or other failure to respond to the request or
any part thereof, or any failure to permit inspection as requested.
Unless the parties otherwise agree, or the court otherwise orders: (i) A a
party who produces documents for inspection shall produce them as
they are kept in the usual course of business or shall organize and label
them to correspond with the categories in the request:; (ii) if a request
does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically stored
information, a responding party must produce the information in a form
or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that
are reasonably usable; and (iii) a party need not produce the same
electronically stored information in more than one form. 
65
By looking at the amended text, one can see that the central focus in
amending Rule 34(b) was to specify the procedures regarding the forms
of production. After the amendments, a party may now request the form
of production that it desires, and the responding party can object to that
requested form. 6 The old Rule 34 did not have any provisions for
specifying the forms in which electronic information was to be
produced . If the parties do not agree on a format and the court does not
65. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 69-71. Italicized text is the text added by the
2oo6 Amendments: strikethrough text is the text deleted by the 2006 Amendments.
66. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b).
67. See FED. R. Ctv. P. 34 (1970).
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order the use of any format, Rule 34 provides that the documents and
data are to be produced in the form in which they are "kept in the usual
course of business. ' This provision did not change, and although there
may be some dispute as to what "usual course of business" entails, it is
relatively straightforward. Rule 34 next lays out the new requirement for
default production, which is not entirely clear. It states that where no
specification is made, the information is to be produced in the form "in
which it is ordinarily maintained," or in a form that is "reasonably
usable." 69 Finally, Rule 34 allows the producing party to produce the
information in only one form.7"
It is important to note that although the amended Rule 34(b) is
ambiguous as to the requirements for the default form of production, it
does clarify many important discovery issues with respect to specified
forms of production, and is more helpful to litigants and courts than its
predecessor.
II. ANALYSIS
When the Rules are interpreted, they are supposed to be given their
plain meaning.' As with statutory interpretation, if the Rule's terms are
clear and unambiguous, the inquiry is complete. In addition to looking
at the language, one must construe each Rule as part of a procedural
system.73 Pursuant to the requirements of Rule I, each rule "shall be
construed ... to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination
of every action. 7 4 However, if a Rule's language is ambiguous and if the
plain meaning cannot be determined, the Advisory Committee Notes
may be referred to in order to aid interpretation.75 As explained below,
Rule 34(b)(ii) is not clear and unambiguous, and we must look to the
other sources to aid in its interpretation.
A. THE LANGUAGE OF RULE 34(b)(ii)
Although the language of Rule 34(b)(ii) appears clear because the
terms "ordinarily maintained" and "reasonably usable" do not appear
vague, there is latent ambiguity in both terms that could lead to
discovery disputes.
68. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(i).
69. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(ii).
70. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b)(iii).
71. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989); see also Bus. Guides,
Inc. v. Chromatic Commc'ns Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 540-41 (199I); Schiavone v. Fortune, 477 U.S. 21,
30 (1986); City of Merced v. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1326, 1337 (E.D. Cal. 1998).
72. Pavelic & LeFlore, 493 U.S. at I23; see also Bus. Guides, 498 U.S. at 540-41; Schiavone, 477
U.S. at 30; Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1337.
73. 4 CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1029
(Supp. 2007); see also Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1337.
74. FED. R. Civ. P. I: see also Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1337.
75. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 73: see also Merced, 997 F. Supp. at 1337.
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Determination of the meaning and requirement of Rule 34(b)(ii)
begins with the language of the Rule. Rule 34(b)(ii) provides two options
for default production of electronically stored information: "[I]f a
request does not specify the form or forms for producing electronically
stored information, a responding party must produce the information in
a form or forms in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms
that are reasonably usable." 6
Thus, the two options for producing electronically stored
information are a form in which the information is "ordinarily
maintained" or in a form that is "reasonably usable.""
i. Production in "Ordinarily Maintained" Form
The phrase "ordinarily maintained" is not defined in Rule 34, so one
must look to its plain meaning.f Looking to the dictionary, "ordinarily
maintained" means a form that is normally or customarily kept. 9
Although the plain meaning seems relatively clear, there is ambiguity in
the words that will affect litigation. Specifically, there will be dispute as
to what "ordinarily" means.
One can imagine a situation where a party has the same
electronically stored information in several different forms. Because
Rule 34(b) requires the production of only one form, and the responding
party could strategically choose to give the requesting party the least
accessible form, parties could dispute whether that form is in fact
"ordinarily" maintained. For instance, "legacy" data, which refers to data
that can only be used by obsolete, superseded systems,"' may be offered
by the responding party as a way of satisfying the default production
requirements under Rule 34(b). If the responding party keeps this
outdated data alongside updated formats, it could still argue that such
antiquated data is "ordinarily maintained."
The requesting party, however, would have a hard time viewing and
using the information in the "legacy" form. The requesting party may not
possess the necessary systems and tools to access the data because "the
physical media on which digital information is stored, and the hardware
needed to retrieve that information, are constantly changing to
accommodate advances in technology."'" Off-the-shelf operating systems
and application software are updated at an ever-increasing pace, and
their predecessors become "outdated and unavailable after only a few
76. FED. R. Cv. P. 34(b)(ii).
77. Id.
78. Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't Group, 493 U.S. 120, 123 (1989).
79. See WEBSTER'S DICTIONARY 749,873 (1 ith ed. 2003).
80. FED. R. CIv. P. 34(b) advisory committee's notes; see also Lloyd S. van Oostenrijk, Comment:
Paper or Plastic?: Electronic Discovery and Spoliation in the Digital Age, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1163, 1175
(2005).
81. Withers, supra note 17, at 175.
November 2007]
HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
years."'" Even though a great deal of electronically stored information
becomes inaccessible every day, the "legacy" data does not disappear."3
The requesting party would therefore have to argue that such legacy data
is not "ordinarily" maintained.
This problem is further complicated by the fact that Rule 34(b)(ii)
lists producing information in a "reasonably usable" form as an
alternative to producing it in a form that is "ordinarily maintained."
These alternative options suggest that a party can produce electronically
stored information in an "ordinarily maintained" form even if that form
is not "reasonably usable." The legacy data example discussed above is
one illustration of this type of problem.
2. Production in "Reasonably Usable" Form
The phrase "reasonably usable," though seemingly clear, is also
ambiguous. Rule 34(b) does not provide any guidance as to what
"reasonably" means. The uncertainty of where to draw the line between
what is "reasonably" usable and what is not will likely lead to litigation
disputes. Furthermore, production of a form that is "reasonably usable"
as an alternative to a form that is "ordinarily maintained" leads to
additional confusion, because the language of Rule 34 causes the two
alternatives to appear equal84 Given the equal status of the two
alternatives, if a party produces the information in an "ordinarily
maintained" form, it does not need to produce the same information in a
"reasonably usable" form; by producing the "ordinarily maintained"
form, the party has complied with Rule 34's requirement. Since
information in a form that is "ordinarily maintained" is not necessarily
"reasonably usable,"5 and because Rule 34(b) equates the two forms, a
party could argue that "reasonably usable" form does not require much
usability. Specifically, the party could emphasize that pursuant to Rule
34, reasonable usability is an option, not a requirement.
Even though the phrase "reasonably usable" is used several times
elsewhere in the Rules, the other uses do not make the phrase any
clearer. Rule 34(a) first uses the phrase in its provision explaining
document production. It states that a party may request electronically
stored information that is translated by the responding party into a
"reasonably usable form.""s Rule 45(d), setting forth the provisions for
82. Id.
83. Id.
84- See Rule 34(b)(ii) ("[l]f a request does not specify the form or forms for producing
electronically stored information, a responding party must produce the information in a form or forms
in which it is ordinarily maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable.") (emphasis
added).
85. See discussion of "legacy" data, supra notes 8o-83 and accompanying text.




responding to subpoenas, also uses the phrase while restating the
language as it appears in Rule 34(b), specifically referring to production
of information pursuant to a subpoena. Neither of these other uses
clarify the meaning of the phrase.
In the end, Rule 34 does not lay out what is required by the words
"ordinarily maintained" or "reasonably usable." This ambiguity suggests
that it is necessary to look beyond the language of Rule 34(b)(ii) to
determine what it requires of litigants. A look at the Rules' principle of
interpretation, as set forth in Rule i, can help resolve the ambiguity.
B. CONSTRUING RULE 34(b)(ii) PURSUANT TO RULE I
Rule I requires that all other rules be construed "to secure the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action."" This principle
of interpretation "reflects the spirit in which the rules were conceived
and written."'  Despite multiple amendments to the Rules, "Rule I
remains as the over-arching and most comprehensive principle of
construction."9' Thus, even though the language of Rule 34(b) is
ambiguous, a possible resolution emerges if one looks to the
considerations of justice, speed, and expense set out in Rule I.
Examining the principles in Rule i leads to the conclusion that Rule
34(b)(ii) requires, as opposed to permits, that documents be produced in
a reasonably usable way.
i. "Just" Determination
Looking to the "just" determination prong of Rule I, one district
court stated, "[a] lawsuit is not a game but a search for truth. The ends of
justice are served, not by giving one side a vested right to exhaust the
other, but by affording both an equal opportunity to a full and fair
adjudication on the merits."9 In another case speaking to the same prong
the court stated that one of discovery's primary objectives is the
elicitation of the facts to promote decisions in accordance with dictates of
justice.93 These statements suggest that the idea behind the "just"
determination prong is to reach the resolution of the case by having the
procedure bring out, rather than hide, the relevant facts. This is
consistent with the concept under which the Rules were adopted: "to put
an end to the sporting theory of justice."'
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 45(b)(i)(B) ("If a subpoena does not specify the form or forms for producing
electronically stored information, a person responding to a subpoena must produce the information in
a form or forms in which the person ordinarily maintains it or in a form or forms that are reasonably
usable.").
89. FED. R. Crv. P. I; see also City of Merced v. Fields, 997 F. Supp. 1336, 1337 (E.D. CAL. 1998).
90. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 73.
91. Id.
92. Polaroid Corp. v. Casselman, 213 F. Supp. 379, 381 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
93. In re Ira Haupt & Co., 253 F. Supp. 97, 99-oo (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
94. Cent. Distribs., Inc. v. M.E.T., Inc., 403 F.2d 943, 946 (5th Cir. 1968); accord Martin v.
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In construing Rule 34(b)(ii) in light of Rule i's mandate to secure
the "just" determination of an action, one can read the phrases
"ordinarily maintained" and "reasonably usable" as going beyond their
plain meaning, in order to ensure that the data produced is such that the
receiving party can discover the necessary facts. Going back to the
example of legacy data, if the responding party has the requested
information stored both as "legacy" data and as something more
updated, "just" determination might require the responding party to
produce the more accessible form, despite the indication from Rule 34's
plain language that the responding party has the choice of which form to
produce. This interpretation is supported by the Rules' goal "of tak[ing]
the sporting element out of litigation . . . by affording each party full
access to evidence" in his opponent's control. 9"
2. "Speedy" and "Inexpensive" Determination
Several district courts have focused on Rule i's "speedy"
determination prong in construing the Rules because, as one court put it,
"one of the basic purposes of the Rules of Federal Procedure is to secure
the 'speedy' determination of pending litigation."" Another district court
in the Seventh Circuit concluded, "[c]ooperation during the discovery
process is essential" to the principles of Rule i." The same court further
explained that "[tjhis is not to say that parties must spare no expense and
scour the four corners of the earth for discoverable material; however,
they must make genuine efforts to accommodate each other." 8 Because
this explanation invokes the "inexpensive" determination prong, in
addition to playing a role in the "speedy" prong, I will address both
prongs together.
The principle requiring a "speedy" and "inexpensive" determination
of the action can also guide parties' and courts' understanding of Rule
34(b)(ii).9 Although Rule 3 4 (b) is not clear as to the requirements for
parties with respect to the default form of production, the requirement of
a "speedy" and "inexpensive" determination in Rule i suggests that the
responding party cannot produce electronically stored information in a
form that is "ordinarily maintained," but not "reasonably usable." A
form of production that is not "reasonably usable" is contrary to the
"speedy" determination principle, because a form that is not "reasonably
usable" necessarily slows litigation. Additionally, a form that is not
"reasonably usable" may force the receiving party to spend more money
than necessary to access the data, violating the "inexpensive" prong of
Reynolds Metals Corp., 297 F.2d 49,56 (9th Cir. i961).
95. Martin , 297 F.2d at 56.
96. Canup v. Miss.Valley Barge Line Co., 31 F.R.D. 282, 283 (W.D. Pa. r963).
97. Frazier v. Layne Christensen Co., 38o F. Supp. 2d 9 89 , 995 (W.D. Wis. 2005).
98. Id.
99. See FED. R. Civ. P. i.
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Rule i. Thus, a form that is not "reasonably usable," though seemingly
acceptable under the "ordinarily maintained" option for production, will
require the receiving party to spend an unnecessary amount of time and
money to access the data. This would violate both the "speedy" and
"inexpensive" prongs, and the resulting dispute would take up large
amounts of the courts' time and resources. Consequently, the "speedy"
and "inexpensive" determination prongs of Rule i require responding
parties to produce the data in a reasonably usable form, even if the
responding party has ordinarily maintained forms that are less accessible.
3. Courts' Discretion
To ensure the achievement of Rule i's policy, district courts have
broad discretion in administering the rules of discovery.'" This discretion
permits a court to work around a rule's ambiguity in order to secure the
"'just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of the action."'... One
district court, in interpreting the original Rule 34, concluded that it
should be construed liberally because "[tlhe Federal Rules were
established to take the guess work out of trials, not add to it."'.
Due to Rule i and the courts' discretion in applying discovery rules,
the responding party may not present the requesting party with
electronically stored information in a form that is "ordinarily
maintained" but not "reasonably usable" if it has an alternative that is
also "reasonably usable." Returning to the "legacy" data example, if the
responding party has information both in an updated format and as
"legacy" data, Rule i requires that the production of the documents be
in the updated format even if the "legacy" data is "ordinarily
maintained." It is not sufficient to produce the "ordinarily maintained"
form, even though the Rules appear to leave open this possibility. While
following the policies set out in Rule i resolves many ambiguities in Rule
34(b)(ii), the Advisory Committee Notes further suggest how to interpret
Rule 3 4(b)(ii).
C. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE NOTES
The Advisory Committee Notes ("Committee Note(s)") consist of
statements about the present state of the law as well as the intent behind
the Rules, and act like a legislative history to the Rules." Although the
Committee Notes are an important source of guidance for litigants and
courts, and are given considerable weight when interpreting the Rules,"°
ioo. Goodrick v. Townsend, 20o6 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14712, at *4. (D. Idaho 2oo6).
ioi. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. i).
102. Sharon Steel Corp. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 26 F.R.D. 113, 115 (N.D. Ohio i96o); accord
Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 2o7 F. Supp. 4o7, 411 (M.D. Pa. 1962).
103. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER. supra note 73.
lo4. Id.; see also Miss. Publ'g Corp. v. Murphtree, 326 U.S. 438, 444 (946).
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they are not conclusive as to the meaning of the Rules. 5 As the Advisory
Committee stated in a Committee Note to the original version of the
Rules:
Statements in the notes... should be taken only as suggestions and
guides to source material. Such statements, and any other statements in
the notes as to the purpose of the effect of the rules, can have no
greater force than the reasons which may be adduced to support them.
The notes are not part of the rules, and the Supreme Court has not
approved or otherwise assumed responsibility for them. They have no
official sanction, and can have no controlling weight with the courts,
when applying the rules in litigated cases."
Despite this disclaimer, in later revisions of the Rules, the
Committee Notes became more extensive and discursive."'° The Advisory
Committee has even used the Committee Notes to guide judicial
construction of a Rule.' 8 Thus, even though the Committee Notes are
not binding, they do provide useful and influential guidance in
determining the meaning of the Rules.
The Committee Note for Rule 34(b), which discusses the concept of
a default form of production, states that the requesting party is not
required to choose a form of production."° The Committee Note
recognizes that the requesting party may not have a preference for a
particular form, or may not know what form the producing party uses to
maintain its electronically stored information."' The Committee Note
then restates Rule 34(b)(ii), stating that "[i]f the form of production is
not specified.., the responding party must produce electronically stored
information either in a form... in which it is ordinarily maintained or in
a form... that [is] reasonably usable .... In this quote, the Committee
Note takes the same problematic position as the Rule itself, viewing the
two options as alternatives, despite the inherent conflict involved."'
After discussing the concept of a default form of production, the
Committee Note next explains the requirements of Rule 34 in great
detail. First, it states that in some circumstances the responding party
may have to "provide some reasonable amount of technical support,
information on application software, or other reasonable assistance to
enable the requesting party to use the information.." 3 The requirement
to provide assistance to the requesting party seems to implicitly
recognize the problem of data that is not "reasonably usable" yet still
105. 4 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 73.
io6. Id.
107. Id. at n.21.
Io8. Id.
I09. FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
IiO. Id.
ti. Id.
I12. See supra Part II.A.
113. FED. R. CIv. P. 34 advisory committee's notes.
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permissible under the "ordinarily maintained" option. Although the
Committee Note does not say when a responding party must provide
"reasonable assistance," it appears that assistance would be required in
those situations where the information is produced in a form that is not
"reasonably usable." If the data were "reasonably usable," presumably
such "assistance to enable the requesting party to use the information"
would not be necessary. Thus, even if a responding party chooses to
produce information in an "ordinarily maintained" form that is not
"reasonably usable," the responding party is essentially giving the
information in "reasonably usable" form by giving reasonable assistance.
This is consistent with the above analysis which found that Rule 34
always requires the production of a "reasonably usable" form even if
there is an alternative "ordinarily maintained" form that the responding
party wishes to produce."4
The Committee Note next states that a party does not have to
produce the information in a form that is ordinarily maintained, "as long
as it is produced in a reasonably usable form.""..5 Again, this language
implicitly endorses the view that the "reasonably usable" form is always
preferable.
The following sentence in the Committee Note slightly alters the
analysis, stating:
[T]he option to produce in a reasonably usable form does not mean
that a responding party is free to convert electronically stored
information from the form in which it is ordinarily maintained to a
different form that makes it more difficult or burdensome for the
requesting party to use the information efficiently in the litigation.' 
6
This sentence suggests that the responding party should produce the
most accessible and most "reasonably usable" form available. A party is
not allowed to reduce the capabilities of very accessible information that
is "ordinarily maintained" to a level that is still "reasonably usable," and
then give it to the requesting party. According to this sentence, a
"reasonably usable" form is not sufficient if the product was originally in
a more accessible form. The Committee Note reinforces this point by
stating: "If the responding party ordinarily maintains the information it is
producing in a way that makes it searchable by electronic means, the
information should not be produced in a form that removes or
significantly degrades this feature."" 
7
The last sentence of the Committee Note, dealing with the default
form of production, directly addresses the topic of this paper, stating:
I14- See supra Part I.B.





Some electronically stored information may be ordinarily maintained
in a form that is not reasonably usable by any party. One example is
"legacy" data that can be used only by superseded systems. The
questions whether a producing party should be required to convert
such information to a more usable form, or should be recuired to
produce it at all, should be addressed under Rule 26(b)(2)(B).
The Committee Note does not directly resolve the dispute over the
production of "ordinarily maintained" information that is not
"reasonably usable." Instead, it directs the parties and the courts to Rule
26(b)(2)(B), which does not require discovery if it is "not reasonably
accessible because of undue burden or cost."" 9
The Committee Note's reference to Rule 26(b)(2)(B) implicitly
supports this Note's conclusion that Rule 34(b)(ii)'s default production
always requires the responding party to produce a "reasonably usable"
form even if it has a different "ordinarily maintained" form. If the
responding party has both forms available, then it cannot make a
successful argument that producing the "reasonably usable" form instead
of the "ordinarily maintained" (but not reasonably usable form) would
be unduly burdensome or costly. Thus, contrary to Rule 34(b)(ii)'s
language, the two alternative forms are not in fact alternatives. If
available, the "reasonably usable" form always prevails.
D. ADDITIONAL DRAFTING HISTORY
The drafting history of Rule 34(b)(ii) is also consistent with this
Note's analysis of Rule 34. The final version of Rule 34(b) gives the
responding party the choice of producing the requested electronically
stored information either in a form in which it is "ordinarily maintained"
or in a "reasonably usable" form.2 ' The published draft of Rule 34(b),
however, initially gave the responding party the choice between a form in
which the information is "ordinarily maintained" and an "electronically
searchable form."'..
During the amendment's public comment period, several
commentators challenged the "electronically searchable form"
118. Id. Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from sources that
the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. On
motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the party from whom discovery is
sought must show that the information is not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. If that showing is made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from
such sources if the requesting party shows good cause .... The court may specify conditions
for the discovery.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
II9. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(2)(B).
120. FED. R. Civ. P. 34(b)(ii).
121. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 64; see also Jeffrey Greenbaum, Report
Regarding Changes to Discovery Rules, A.B.A. SECTION OF LITIGATION, STANDARDS & POLICY,
http://www.abanet.org/litigation/standards/docs/ediscovery report.pdf (last visited Oct. 31, 2007).
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alternative because "[a] form that is readily searchable on one party's
system may not be easily searched, or searched at all, on another party's
system ..... Furthermore, this option would "authorize production in a
minimally searchable form even though more easily searched forms
might be available.""..3 In response to these concerns, Rule 34(b) was
revised, replacing the "electronically searchable form" option with
"reasonably usable." The Advisory Committee was clear that the
responding party would be able to give the receiving party the requested
information in a "reasonably usable" form.'24 Alternatively, it could
provide the responding party with a form in which it ordinarily maintains
information, but if not reasonably usable, "the [responding] party might
have to translate the information to make it 'reasonably usable." 25
The drafting history supports this Note's analysis for several reasons.
First, it implies that "ordinarily maintained" forms are effectively
equivalent to "reasonably usable" forms, because the responding party
might have to translate information into an "ordinarily maintained" form
to be "reasonably usable." Second, the Advisory Committee
acknowledged the problem with the "electronically searchable form"
permitting the responding party to produce a minimally searchable form,
suggesting the Advisory Committee knew the drafting of the Rules was
consistent with the principle of Rule I. A minimally searchable form is
insufficient because it hides, rather than brings out, the facts,"6 and does
not "put an end to the sporting theory of justice" as required by some
courts.' 7 Third, the fact the "reasonably usable" option replaced the
"electronically searchable" option because it was insufficiently
accessible, demonstrates that the Advisory Committee was working to
make default production more accessible to the receiving party.
CONCLUSION
This Note has attempted to explain what actions parties must take in
order to meet the requirements for default production under Rule 34(b).
To summarize, Rule 34(b)(ii) gives responding parties an alternative
between providing information in a form that is "ordinarily maintained"
or one that is "reasonably usable." If a party provides the information in
a form that is "ordinarily maintained," on the surface Rule 34 appears to
say that it does not also have to be in a "reasonably usable" form. This
apparent clarity is misleading and Rule 34's language is ambiguous.
Through Rule i's mandate to give the Rules a construction that
122. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 5, at 64.
123. Id. at 77.
124. Id. at 64.
125. Id.
126. See In re Ira Haupt & Co., 253 F. Supp. 97, ioo (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
127. Cent. Distribs., Inc. v. M.E.T., Inc., 403 F.2d 943,946 (5th Cir. 1968).
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secures "the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action
in fact," and Rule 34(b)'s drafting history, it is apparent that every
production of information must meet the "reasonably usable"
requirement. Even though a responding party has the option of
producing information in an "ordinarily used" form, if that form is not
reasonably accessible, then the responding party must take steps to make
that format accessible to the receiving party. This requirement means
that an "ordinarily maintained" form that is not "reasonably usable"
must be made "reasonably usable" by the responding party.
This construction of Rule 34(b)(ii), though seemingly contrary to its
plain language, secures a just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
the action, as required by Rule i. Furthermore, this construction meets
the intent of Rule 34's drafters to make the default production accessible
to the responding party.
Courts should follow this construction in determining whether the
form of production provided by the responding party meets the
requirements of Rule 34(b)(ii). Furthermore, the Rules' drafters should
address this construction by clarifying Rule 34(b)'s language and
explicitly stating that a party must produce the electronically stored
information in a "reasonably usable" form. Alternatively, the drafters of
the Rules could address this issue in the Note accompanying the Rules,
which would also have the effect of guiding both parties' and courts'
interpretation of Rule 34. If the drafters do not clarify this point, the
ambiguity will continue to trouble litigants and courts, reducing the
capability of Rule 34 to fully achieve the purpose of the Rules.
[VoI. 59:22I1
